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Sammendrag 
I denne artikkelen forsøker jeg å finne et mål på hvor godt bolig og boligeier passer sammen. Dette 
er vanskelig observerbart, men å ha et godt mål kan være nyttig av flere årsaker. For det første gir 
mange boligmodeller prediksjoner på hvordan dette målet samvarierer med andre, observerbare kjen-
netegn ved boligmarkedet, og målet kan dermed brukes til å teste hvorvidt disse prediksjonene holder. 
I tillegg kan et mål på hvorvidt eier og bolig passer sammen også brukes til å studere for eksempel 
hvor viktig villighet til å flytte er for varigheten av arbeidsløshet. 
Ideen bak målet er at hvorvidt en kjøper ligner på forrige kjøper av samme bolig inneholder infor-
masjon. Enhver person vil verdsette en bolig forskjellig, fordi vekten som legges på geografisk plasse-
ring, planløsning, standard o.l. varierer. Hvis man antar at denne verdsettingen av bolig er korrelert 
med observerbare kjennetegn ved personen (for eksempel alder og utdanning), så vil nye boligkjøpere 
passe godt med boligene de kjøper hvis de er like de forrige kjøperne. Dette vises teoretisk i en enkel 
søkemodell.  
Deretter bruker jeg detaljert informasjon om boligkjøper og boliger over perioden 2007 – 2014 til å 
konstruere et mål på likhet mellom nye og forrige kjøpere. Likhet måles ved alder, kjønn, hushold-
ningsstørrelse, antall barn, og utdanningsnivå.  
Kjøperpar er likere i folkerike kommuner enn de er i kommuner med få innbyggere. Og i perioder 
med høye boligpriser er kjøperpar likere enn i perioder med lave priser. Dette stemmer med teorien 
om at det er lettere å finne en passende bolig i markeder med mange salgsobjekter. 
Ved hjelp av hedonisk regresjon viser jeg at kjøpere som er like de forrige kjøperne betaler en høy-
ere pris enn de som ikke er like. Dette gjelder også hvis man kontrollerer for et stort antall kjennetegn 
ved boligene. At like kjøpere betaler mer betyr at de verdsetter boligen mer, og støtter ideen om å 
bruke likhet mellom kjøper og forrige kjøper som mål på hvor godt bolig og boligeier passer sammen. 
I tillegg styrkes bruken av likhet mellom kjøper og forrige kjøper som mål ved at like kjøpere blir 
boende lenger i boligene sine, og at de i større grad får barn i årene som følger kjøp. 
 
1 Introduction
Match quality in a housing market setting is the unique buyer valuation which exists for
each buyer-house match. It is separate from the common utility of the house, which can
be seen as the average value of the amenities of the house. The idea is that even though all
buyers see the same house, each buyer will put an unique value on the house's combination
of location, spatial layout, view and so forth. In housing search models, match quality is
mostly modeled as a random variable, which is unobservable to observers.
Being able to measure match quality would be useful to evaluate the housing search
models that use the concept, as they often include predictions for how match quality
diﬀers over states of the economy. It would also allow for further research into what
eﬀects housing match quality has on outcomes such as e.g. mobility. There has been
suggestions that the reduced mobility of home-owners leads to higher unemployment.1 If
that is the case, not only ownership percentages, but also match quality levels may aﬀect
unemployment.
The concept of match quality is important in several housing market models.2 Anenberg
and Bayer (2013) develop a housing search model with an important role for the timing
of buying and selling of those agents who want to both buy and sell a house. Agents'
choice of selling before buying or buying before selling is shown to amplify the volatility
of housing market cycles. Match quality is normally distributed and idiosyncratic to each
meeting between buyer and house. Even though the distribution of match quality in
meetings is similar between periods, the dynamics of the model mean that the average
match quality for housing transactions diﬀer between periods. In a seller's markets, when
there are many buyers compared to sellers, agents require a lower draw of match quality
to buy before selling than in a buyer's market.
The focus in Ngai and Tenreyro (2014) is on how the thick-market eﬀect leads to seasonal
housing markets. Housing markets show strong, predictable seasonal patterns, where
hot markets with high prices and numerous transactions alternate with colder markets.
To explain this, Ngai and Tenreyro model a housing market with thick-market eﬀects,
i.e. where the expected match quality is positively correlated with the number of houses
for sale. They also show empirical support for the idea that average match quality is
higher for houses transacted in hot markets than in cold markets.3 The thick-market
eﬀect ampliﬁes small diﬀerences in moving probability into sizable seasonal trends.
Expanding on the thick-market eﬀect, Nenov et al. (2016) show that greater heterogeneity
in the housing stock amplify the thick-market eﬀects. This would lead to a prediction that
the eﬀect of match quality on prices would be lower in areas with relatively homogeneous
1See e.g. Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2012), who ﬁnd a link between home-ownership and unemployment.
The eﬀect is small when the model is calibrated to match real data.
2Match quality also plays a central role in the literature of labor market matching (e.g. Pissarides,
1985; Bowlus, 1995) and marriage matching (Weiss and Willis, 1997).
3They proxy match quality by the duration of stay, and by the number and cost of repairs and
alterations performed on the house in the ﬁrst two years of ownership.
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housing. The match quality of current housing owners could also aﬀect the number of
housing transactions in the future, as in the model of Ngai and Sheedy (2016). There, the
moving decision depends on the match quality. All housing owners with a match quality
below a cut-oﬀ dependent on the state of the economy choose to move.
However, while match quality is usually assumed observable for the housing buyer, it is
not easily observable for an econometrician. In housing search models, match quality is
mostly modeled as a random variable. Intuition would perhaps suggest measuring match
quality as the residual of price from a hedonic price regression, but that measure may be
distorted by the heat of the housing market. In hot housing markets, with the increased
possibility of bidding wars (Han and Strange, 2014), a high price may represent high
bargaining power for the seller rather than a high match quality.4 The same concern
would apply to using time-on-market as a proxy for match quality. The perhaps most
obvious measure of match quality is how long a buyer actually remains in a house. But this
measure requires collecting data for a number of years following purchase. The measure
suggested here allows for an almost contemporaneous measure.
This paper presents a novel idea for how to use rich data to measure match quality.
Assuming observable characteristics of buyers are correlated with their preferences for
housing, successive owners of houses should share characteristics. An observer could
expect a new owner to have higher match quality if similar to the old owner than if
dissimilar. I develop a simple matching model based on Ngai and Tenreyro (2014) to
show this mechanism.
In the empirical part of the paper, I connect information on present sellers from the time
when they bought (previous buyers), with characteristics of the present buyers. The
reason for using the information on sellers from the time they bought instead of the time
they sell is that the I want to measure how similar the two buyers are. Imagine a 30 year
old buyer, who ﬁnds a house she likes, stays in a house for 10 years, and gets 2 children,
before she needs more space and decides to sell. I would expect the next buyer to be well
matched if she is 30 years old, without children, not if she is 40 with two children.
Using the connected buyer characteristics it is possible to measure the similarity between
the buyer and the previous buyer (who is now selling). I show that the (Mahalanobis)
distance between buyer and previous buyer can be used as a proxy for match quality.
Buyers who resemble the previous buyers are paying more, also when a large number of
observable characteristics are controlled for. Note that I do not claim that this measure
can be used to evaluate match quality for every single transaction, but the measure is
useful for ﬁnding the average match quality, e.g. in a certain period, or equivalently, the
probability that a match is good.
Supplementary analyses strengthen my claim that the distance between seller and buyer
can be used as a proxy for match quality. Matches with low distance seem to survive
4See i.e. Carrillo (2013) for a model where high prices are a result of the bargaining power of the
seller.
5
longer. Low distance matches also lead to an increased probability of having children,
which I argue would be expected in a high quality match. The distance metric is clearly
signiﬁcant in a logit regression of increased number of children in the household in the
years after the house is bought.
In Section 2, a matching model is presented. The data I use is described in Section 3,
followed by an explanation of the distance metric in Section 4. Section 5 contains the
results, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, a simple search and matching model is sketched. The purpose of the
model is to illustrate how the observable characteristics of buyers and sellers can be used
to measure match quality. This is done to explain why I interpret the similarity of buyer
and past buyer shown in Section 5 as a proxy for match quality.
The model is based on a non-seasonal version of the model in Ngai and Tenreyro (2014).5
The main new feature of the model is that the match quality depends on heterogeneous
types of buyers and houses. Match quality does not only depend on a randomly drawn
value, as in Anenberg and Bayer (2013) or Ngai and Tenreyro (2014), but also reﬂects
that some observable characteristics of a buyer (e.g. age, number of children) increase
match quality for certain kinds of houses.
The economy consists of a unit measure of inﬁnitely lived, risk neutral agents who receive
utility from owning a house. The agents have three states: owners, buyers and sellers.
A measure o of agents are owners, who are matched with their houses. They receive
utility per period for being matched, which depends on the individual match quality.
Each period, the probability of a mismatch shock is δ, in which case the agents become
sellers. The house is put for sale, and per period utility is u. After sellers have sold
their house, they receive utility equal to the transaction price of the house, and exit the
economy.
Buyers enter the economy at rate δo, keeping the population constant. Buyers meet sellers
in a market with search frictions.
So far, these are standard assumptions. In addition, owners and buyers diﬀer over a
set of characteristics X, the distribution of which is similar at all times.6 To clearly
expose the mechanics of the model, I will model X as a single variable with two possible
values [x1, x2], thus there are two types of buyers in the model, with measure b1 and
b2.
7 Similarly, there are two types of houses for sale, with measure v1 and v2, one that is
(slightly) preferred by buyers of type 1, the other by type 2.
5Though unlike Ngai and Tenreyro, there is no thick-market eﬀect on match quality in my model.
6I assume that it is impossible for buyers to observe the sellers X.
7This is done for simplicity in presentation. Generalizing X to a more ﬂexible distribution would give
similar results.
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The per period returns from a house can be modeled as u+ i, where u is the ﬂow utility
from owning the house common to all prospective owners. It can be seen as the average
value of the house's amenities. Match quality, i, is individual and unique for each match
between house and house owner. I assume that match quality is uncorrelated with u, and
correlated with the observable characteristics of the buyer, or buyer type: i = γjk + ηi,
where j ∈ [b1, b2] and k ∈ [v1, v2]. Thus, the match value for a house is a common
valuation, u, plus the match quality, which is a function of how well X (i.e. buyer age)
ﬁts with the house type, and a stochastic error term η.
The value of a buyer of type j buying a house of type k is thus:
H(bj , vk, η) = u+ γjk + η + β[(1− δ)H ′(bj , vk, η) + δV ′(vk)], (1)
where γjk is higher if j = k, and η is i.i.d. and drawn from the distribution F (η). The
value function of a particular match H(bj , vk, η) is the present period value of the match,
plus the value of the match in next period, adjusted by the probability of a moving shock,
δ, occurring in next period. The discount rate is given byβ.
The match quality of a house can only be observed during a visit, so ex-ante, buyers
know neither the type of a house nor the stochastic match quality (but they do know the
distribution of houses for sale).8 If house type was known in advance, all buyers of one
type would buy houses of their type.
The total surplus when a seller and buyer meet is:
S(bj , vk, η) = H(bj , vk, η)− β(B′(bj) + V ′(vk)) + u, (2)
where β(B′(bj)+V ′(vk)) is the discounted value of remaining respectively a buyer of type
j and a seller with a house of type k in next period
I assume that the draws of γ and η are common knowledge during a meeting between
buyer and seller. A transaction thus happens if the surplus of a meeting is positive,
S(bj , vk, η) ≥ 0, or using (2) :
H(bj , vk, η)− β(B′(bj) + V ′(vk)) + u ≥ 0. (3)
What can be observed in (3) is that the surplus of a meeting depends on the value of
the match, H. As expected H is higher if buyer and house type correspond, so is the
meeting surplus. Prices are determined as a bargaining problem between buyer and seller.
I model the bargaining process as Nash bargaining with weights θ and (1−θ) for seller and
buyer respectively, but the speciﬁc bargaining process is not important. Any bargaining
process with a bargaining weight higher than 0 for the buyer will give higher prices when
8The buyer observes the match quality fully during a visit. Unlike the labor market search model of
Jovanovic (1979), there is no learning about match quality over time.
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the surplus is higher and be suﬃcient for the results below: prices are higher when a
buyer is of the same type as the past buyer.
2.1 Steady state equilibrium
I have shown that the expected matching surplus and price are higher when the buyer
and house types match. What I want to show is how prices vary with the match between
buyer type and past buyer type. To look at that dynamic, I here solve the model for
steady state. In steady state, the owner value function becomes:9
Hjk(η) =
u+ γjk + η
1− β(1− δ) +
δVk
1− β(1− δ) . (4)
Transactions occur if ηi ≥ η∗jk, where η∗jk is the lowest draw of the idiosyncratic match
quality which makes the surplus non-negative:
η∗jk =: Hjk(η) = β(Bj + Vk) + u. (5)
Using the deﬁnition from (5) in the owner value function (4) gives:
γjk + η
∗
jk = (1− β(1− δ))βBj + ((1− β(1− δ))β − δ)Vk − β2(1− δ)u. (6)
From (6) it can be noted that with a match between buyer and house type (γjk high),
the idiosyncratic match draw needed for a transaction, η∗jk, is lower than if there is a
mismatch between buyer and house type.
By using (5) it is also possible to rewrite the surplus of a match:
Sjk = H(bj , vk, η)−H(bj , vk, η∗jk) =
η − η∗jk
1− β(1− δ) , (7)
which means that the expected surplus for a match that leads to a transaction can be
written as E(Sjk|η > η∗jk) =
E[η−η∗jk|η>η∗jk]
1−β(1−δ)
The value function of a buyer of type j is
Bj = β[B
′
j + (1− θ)
∑
(
k
vk
vt
(1− F (η∗jk))E[Sjk|η > η∗jk])] (8)
where the total measure of houses, vt =
∑
vk
k
, and
∑
k
vk
vt (1−F (η∗jk)) is the probability for
a buyer of type j that a transaction goes through. The buyer gets the continuation value
of being a buyer in next period (B′j), plus a share (1− θ) of the surplus of a transaction
9To save space, I use subscripts j, k in the following to denote that value functions depend on buyer
and/or house type.
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if it goes through. Both the surplus and probability of a transaction depends on the type
of house that the buyer inspects. As the buyer cannot in advance observe the type of
house, the probability of the buyer of meeting a seller with house k depends on the share
of houses for sale of each type.
Using (7), the buyer value function can be written as:
Bj = β[B
′
j + (1− θ)
∑
(
k
vk
vt
h∗(η∗jk)
1− β(1− δ) )], (9)
where h∗(η∗jk) = (1− F (η∗jk))E[η − η∗jk|η > η∗jk] is the expected surplus of a match.
In steady state:
Bj =
1− θ
(1− β)(1− β(1− δ))
∑
(
k
vk
vt
h∗(η∗jk)) (10)
The value function of a seller with house of type k is
Vk = u+ β[V
′
k + θ
∑
j
(
bj
bt
h∗(η∗jk)
1− β(1− δ) )], (11)
where bt =
∑
bj
j
. The seller value function is quite similar to the buyer value function.
The seller gets the continuation value of being a seller in next period, V ′k, plus a share of
the surplus of a transaction if it goes through, which depends on the type of buyer that
visits the house. In addition the seller gets the value u of owning a mismatched house.
The steady state seller value function is:
Vk =
u
1− β +
θ
(1− β)(1− β(1− δ))
∑
j
(
bj
bt
h∗(η∗jk)) (12)
The law of motion for mismatched houses (or houses for sale) of type k is
v′k = δ(
∑
j
[
bj
bt
vk(1− F (η∗jk))] + 1− vk) +
∑
j
[
bj
bt
vkF (η
∗
jk)]
= (1− δ)
∑
j
[
bj
bt
vkF (η
∗
jk)] + δ. (13)
The ﬁrst term in the ﬁrst equation are houses which are put for sale in the current period,
a share δ of the houses which were not previously for sale. The second term represents
the unsold houses from the last period, which are the houses where the η drawn in the
match were too low for a transaction to occur. In steady state, the law of motion for
houses can be written as:
vk =
δ
1− (1− δ)∑
j
bj
btF (η
∗
jk)
. (14)
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Similarly, the steady state law of motion for buyers of type j is
bj =
δ
1− (1− δ)∑
j
vj
vtF (η
∗
jk)
. (15)
The expected price of a transaction where a type j buyer transacts with a seller of type
k is the solution to a Nash bargaining problem over the surplus of the transaction:
E[Pjk] = (1− θ) u
(1− β) + θE[H(Xj , vk, η)|η > η
∗
jk]. (16)
Using the fact that E[H(Xj , vk, η)|η > η∗jk] can be rewritten as H(Xj , vk, η∗jk)+E[Sjk|η >
η∗jk], the price is given as (see Appendix A for details):
E[Pjk] =
u
(1− β) +
θ
(1− β(1− δ)) [β
1− θ
(1− β) (
∑
[
k
vk
vt
h∗(η∗jk)]) +
θ
(1− β) (
∑
j
[
bj
bt
h∗(η∗jk)]) + E[η − η∗jk|η > η∗jk]] (17)
2.2 Theoretical results
For a house of a certain type k, the share of buyers j with Xj giving a high γjk should
be higher than their share in the population, even though the matching of houses and
buyers is random. This result is due to the fact that Pr[S(i) ≥ 0] increases with γjk, as
there is less need for a high draw of the random match quality η.
In steady state, this result will hold for each period. Thus, a disproportionate share of
sellers will also be of a type that matches the house. This means that the probability of
a transaction is high when the seller used to be the same type as the buyer.
Secondly, the match quality of buyers involved in matched transactions (j = k), should
on average be higher than that of other buyers. Higher average match quality will be
reﬂected in higher prices. The expected surplus E[Sjk|η > η∗jk] of a transaction also
increases with γjk as the average match value increases. This can be seen by combining
(6) and (7).
Sjk =
η + γjk − (1− β(1− δ))β(Bj + Vk) + δVk − β2(1− δ)u
1− β(1− δ) (18)
When the surplus is high, bargaining over prices means that the price is also high.
The size of these eﬀects can be shown in numerical simulations.
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2.3 Numerical results
I simulate the model using parameter values taken from Ngai and Tenreyro (2014). Each
period represents half a year. The implied yearly interest rate β is equal to 6 percent and
the yearly user cost of housing u is 3 percent of the housing price.10 The rate of moving
shocks, δ is set to get an average duration of stay of 13 years, while the bargaining weight
of sellers, θ, equals 0.5. The model is symmetric, i.e. the share of buyers and houses of
both types is 0.5, and the value of γ (the preference of a buyer for a house of same type)
is similar for both buyer-house type match.
Table 1 presents model simulations of the share of buyers that buy houses of their favored
type in column (2). It then shows the price they pay relative to the price of houses bought
by buyers of the other type, as the value of γ for matched buyer house types relative to
mismatched buyer house types changes. In all simulations, the value of γ for mismatched
types (j 6= k) is 0. The ﬁrst row is the case where there is no diﬀerence in preferences
between types (γ = 0). The table indicates that as γ for j = k increases, the share of
buyers buying from sellers who used to be the same type is increasing. Also, the higher
γ, the larger the price mark-up those buyers pay compared to buyers of the other type.
Table 1: Numerical results
Share Price Share Share Price
γ(j = k) buyers premium buyers j=j-1 buyers j 6=j-1 premium
j=k j=k where j=k where j=k j=j-1
0.00 0.500 1.000 0.500 0.500 1.000
0.05 0.514 1.003 0.529 0.500 1.000
0.10 0.529 1.006 0.557 0.500 1.000
0.15 0.543 1.008 0.585 0.500 1.001
0.20 0.557 1.011 0.613 0.500 1.001
0.25 0.571 1.014 0.640 0.500 1.002
0.30 0.585 1.017 0.666 0.500 1.003
0.35 0.600 1.020 0.692 0.500 1.004
0.40 0.614 1.022 0.717 0.500 1.005
0.45 0.628 1.025 0.741 0.500 1.006
0.50 0.643 1.028 0.764 0.500 1.007
Notes: Results of numerical simulations of the model for diﬀerent levels of type
preference (γ).
For comparisons with the empirical part of this paper, it is interesting to calculate the
properties of transactions between types of buyers and previous buyers. Column (4) and
(6) of Table 1 reports the share of buyers buying from similar past buyers, and the price
they pay compared to those who do not buy from similar past buyers.
To explain the calculation of these results, I use the numbers from the last row as an
example. In a steady state, the past distribution of sellers and buyers is similar to the
10A model where all buyers are of the same type, and all houses supply utility u + η to any matched
owner is used to calibrate the values of u (and the η∗ and P needed to ﬁnd u).
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present distribution. Looking at those buying a house of type 1, the share of type 1 buyers
buying from past type 1 buyers is 0.643×0.643 = 0.413. A smaller share, 0.230 are type 1
buyers buying from type 2, similarly, 0.230 are type 2 buyers buying from type 1. Lastly,
0.127 are type 2 buyers buying from type 2. Thus, 76 percent of the buyers buying from
similar buyers are matched with their type of house, versus 50 percent of those buying
from diﬀerent buyers. The average price buyers that are similar to past buyers pay is
higher than for non-similar buyers (1.007 times the non-match price). This increase in
price, for buyers who buy from similar past buyers, is what I look for in the empirical
part of the paper. The size of the price premium is dependent on a lot of assumptions in
the simulations, and is thus not so interesting in itself.
3 Data
Housing transaction and ownership data from three diﬀerent sources are merged with a
register covering personal characteristics. Data on registered transfers of real property
(Tinglysning) come from the Norwegian Mapping Authority, and include the personal
identiﬁer of sellers and buyers, as well as some information on the transacted house.
The data cover the period 2007-2014, though transactions of co-operative housing are not
included. Additional data on transactions are gathered from the main Norwegian housing
search web page (Finn.no) which covers a large share of market transactions. These data
include information on transaction price, time on market and housing characteristics,
including appraisal value.
A third data source is the Norwegian cadastre (Matrikkelen), which holds information
about ownership of all housing, at least back to 2004. Through the cadastre, length of
ownership is found, also for ownerships where I do not have repeated transactions in the
time period 2007-2014. Since a starting year of 2004 in the data may reﬂect either a
transaction taking place in 2004 or the ownership being registered in the cadastre, I am
only able to use repeated transactions taking place in the period 2005 to 2014.
The data on registered transfers, housing sales and ownership history are connected
through housing registry information which not only allows for identiﬁcation of single
houses, but also units of multi-unit housing. Through the personal identiﬁer, personal
characteristics of both seller (at the time the seller bought the house) and buyer is added:
income, wealth, level of education, previous house ownership, household size and number
of children.11 The information on personal characteristics comes from the Income and
wealth statistics for households (Statistics Norway, 2015), which covers the whole popu-
lation of Norway and includes information from income tax returns, education registers,
etc.
All in all, the data set covers 139,688 repeated sales; pairs of housing transactions where
I know the characteristics of the buyers in both set of transactions, and have informa-
11Information is from December 31st of the year prior to buying
12
Figure 1: Density of the Mahalanobis distance
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the density of the estimated Mahalanobis distance.
tion on transaction price in at least the second transaction. Data on some of the other
characteristics, in particular the appraisal value of houses, are limited to a smaller sample.
4 The distance metric
In the literature on assortative mating, which this paper somewhat resembles, equality
between spouses is measured in terms of e.g. their education levels (Mare, 1991) or occu-
pation (Kalmijn, 1994). As for the housing market, other household characteristics, such
as age and household characteristics (size and number of children) also seem important
determinants of housing demand. When including age and household characteristics, the
one-dimensional measures of similarity normally used for quantifying assortative mating
can no longer be applied.
In this paper, the similarity between buyer and previous buyer is measured as the Ma-
halanobis distance (Mahalanobis, 1936). The Mahalanobis distance measures the multi-
variate distance between observations, scaled by the covariance of covariates (Mardia et
al., 1989). If the covariance matrix is the identity matrix, it is equal to the Euclidean
distance. The variables used to measure similarity are age, household size, number of
children under 18, and dummies for no high school, high school and university education.
I drop the observations above the 99th percentile of the Mahalanobis distance to avoid
outliers inﬂuencing the results.
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The distribution of the distance metric is bi-modal, as shown in Figure 1, a ﬁrst peak
where the education of buyer and previous buyer is similar, the second where the education
is diﬀerent. The mean and median value of the distance is 3.8 and 3.6 respectively.
Table 2: Mean Values
(1) All (2) Similar (3) Dissimilar (4) T-test
Wage 391,998 408,453 375,543 -15.18
Disposable income 349,067 359,617 338,517 -10.30
Capital income 31,644 34,283 29,005 -2.69
Past housing value 264,435 280,751 248,118 -13.40
Financial wealth 744,508 768,297 720,718 -0.78
Age buyer 38.4 38.6 38.2 -5.00
Household size 2.51 2.30 2.71 59.33
Children under 18 0.61 0.50 0.72 45.48
Share below high School 0.19 0.08 0.31 108.19
Share high School 0.38 0.42 0.35 -27.25
Share university 0.42 0.50 .35 -57.22
Buying year 2010.6 2010.7 2010.6 -3.58
Transaction price 2,636,053 2,784,141 2,487,968 -38.53
Housing size 107.5 106.2 108.7 8.40
Share villa 0.38 0.36 0.41 21.43
Share ﬂat 0.46 0.49 0.43 -19.82
Observations 137,239 68,619 68,620
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the data set used for analyses. Column (1) presents all obser-
vations, column (2) and (3) the observations with Mahalanobis distance respectively below and
above the median. Column (4) shows a T-test of equality between (2) and (3).
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics of the observations with a distance below and above
median. In similar matches buyers are more educated and have somewhat higher income.
Similar matches also occur at higher prices even though the housing size is slightly smaller,
which suggests either higher quality houses or more attractive locations. There are also
fewer villas, but more ﬂats in the similar matches group. The table also shows a T-test
of similarity between the groups. Most variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
It is possible that cities, with larger housing markets and more heterogeneous housing
stock, have more segmented housing markets, and thus more similar buyers.12 In the
results, I will use speciﬁcations with municipality ﬁxed eﬀects to control for this possibility.
The model of Ngai and Tenreyro (2014) predicts higher match quality in seasons with thick
markets. Similarly, one would expect better matches in bigger cities, where the market is
thicker. This is conﬁrmed in Figure 2, which plots the mean of the Mahalanobis distance
against the log number of transactions in each municipality.13 There is a clear trend
for a large number of transactions (a thick market) being correlated with low distance
(more similar matches). The low distance for larger municipalities also holds consistently
12The segmentation of housing markets in cities is explored in Piazzesi et al. (2015).
13A few municipalities with only one transaction not displayed.
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Figure 2: Mahalanobis distance, large and small markets
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the average Mahalanobis distance against the log number of trans-
actions within each municipality with more than 5 transactions. It also ﬁts a linear regression
of the correlation between distance and log transaction numbers.
over time. In Figure 3, transactions from the ﬁve municipalities with most transactions,14
marked Large cities, is contrasted against transactions from the remaining municipalities
(Other municipalities). While the monthly trends look quite similar, the level of the
distance is clearly lower in the large cities.
Next, in Figure 4, I show the distribution of the Mahalanobis distance over time, together
with the development of housing prices. While the average value of the Mahalanobis
distance shows some variation from month to month, it seems like the value is usually low
in times with high housing prices. This means that new buyers are closer to old buyers
in periods with high prices. A similar pattern holds for the relationship between distance
and number of transactions; transaction number is negatively correlated with distance
(see Figure A.1 in the appendix).
While there is a clear negative correlation between prices and distance, the changes in
this correlation over time also show some interesting patterns. The 12-month rolling
correlation between log prices and Mahalanobis distance is shown in Figure 5. The months
referred to in the ﬁgure are the starting months of each 12 month window.
The correlation is negative over the whole period, but there is a downward trend beginning
in mid 2008, continuing until the ﬁrst part of 2012. Interestingly, this trend appears to
14Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger and Bærum.
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Figure 3: Mahalanobis distance, large and small markets over time
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the average Mahalanobis distance of observations in large cities and
other municipalities. Large cities are the municipalities of Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, Stav-
anger and Bærum.
Figure 4: Mahalanobis distance over time
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the average Mahalanobis distance and log housing price over time.
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Figure 5: Rolling correlation of Mahalanobis distance and price, and transaction numbers
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the 12-month rolling correlation of Mahalanobis distance and price,
and the average number of housing transactions over the same 12 months.
coincide with a time when the housing market went from a period of stagnation (following
the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis) to a period of growth, as shown in Figure 5 by the growing average
number of transactions over the same period. This, as well as the diﬀerence in distance
between large cities and smaller municipalities, is in line with the model in Ngai and
Tenreyro (2014), where thick-market eﬀects lead to high match quality when the stock of
houses for sale is larger.
5 Results
I use the housing transaction data, and information about the Mahalanobis distance
between the buyer in the current and the previous transaction to see if the distance
correlates with housing price. The regressions presented here are informed by the simple,
theoretical search model in Section 3. The dependent variable is the log housing price,
while the independent variables are the Mahalanobis distance and log appraisal value
(which is a proxy for the quality of the house to the average buyer, u in the model).
The main diﬀerence from the model is that I now have to worry about the impact of
the housing price cycle, which is not included in the model, and the possibility that
match quality diﬀers over housing type and geography. Thus, later speciﬁcations add
additional controls: month and year ﬁxed eﬀects, variables reﬂecting the income and
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wealth of buyers and characteristics of the house, municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, and ﬁnally
characteristics of the seller. This last speciﬁcation is shown in equation (19), with log
price dependent on the Mahalanobis distance, the appraisal value, a set of buyer, house
and seller characteristics, plus time and municipality ﬁxed eﬀects.
ln(pimt) = β0+β1mdimt+β2 ln(apimt)+β3Bimt+β4Himt+β3Simt+µt+γm+εimt (19)
The main results are presented in Table 3. Through all speciﬁcations, the distance coef-
ﬁcient is signiﬁcant and negative. Buying from a seller who had diﬀerent characteristics
is correlated with lower price, and I interpret that as a sign of lower match quality.
Also worth noting is that the appraisal value is, unsurprisingly, always very important for
the price. But when other information is added, in particular municipality ﬁxed eﬀects,
the coeﬃcient decreases from above 0.95 to around 0.8. The signs on the remaining coef-
ﬁcients are mostly as expected, with wealth, income, family size and education positively
correlated with the price.
The last speciﬁcation adds seller characteristics. Seller characteristics do matter for the
price; both a likelihood ratio test and a Wald test reject the hypothesis that seller charac-
teristics are jointly insigniﬁcant. This contrasts with the assumptions from the theoretical
model.
It could be imagined that there are diﬀerences between housing types which are not fully
captured by a dummy variable in the full regression.15 As a robustness check, Table A.1-
A.3 in the appendix show the speciﬁcations from Table 3, run separately on row-houses,
villas and ﬂats. The size and signiﬁcance of the distance measures roughly holds for all
three speciﬁcations, though it is somewhat weaker for villas.
5.1 Ownership length of sellers
Using similarity as a proxy for match quality depends on the idea that past and present
buyers should be similar because they are both likely to have an unobserved preference
for that particular house. In the data, there is a relatively large amount of housing with a
very short ownership length. There is reason to believe that most of these cases are either
houses bought, renovated and resold as investments, or houses where the owner feels
mismatched straight away. Neither of these cases ﬁt with the theoretical model, where
ownership length is only determined by the occurrence of random mismatch shocks.
Here, I look at how ownership length aﬀects the results. Similarity between buyers should
not be a predictor of good match quality, and thus excessive price, if the ownership length
of sellers has been very short. The observations where the ownership length (i.e. time
15Flats are e.g. usually smaller, with higher price per sq.m. and shorter time of stay than other types
of housing.
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Table 3: Results
Log price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance -0.0183** -0.0021** -0.0021** -0.0014** -0.0009**
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Log appraisal value 0.959** 0.953** 0.802** 0.797**
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Buyer log Wage 0.0007** 0.0007**
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Buyer log Wealth 0.0051** 0.0050**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Size of househ. buyer 0.0013* 0.0011
(0.0006) (0.0006)
No. of children buyer -0.0027** -0.0028**
(0.0009) (0.0009)
High school buyer 0.0099** 0.0098**
(0.0013) (0.0013)
University buyer 0.0254** 0.0247**
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Villa -0.0058** -0.0036*
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Flat -0.0036* -0.0029
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Log square meters 0.113** 0.115**
(0.0018) (0.0018)
Size of househ. seller 0.0015*
(0.0007)
No. of children seller -0.0004
(0.0010)
High school seller 0.0137**
(0.0013)
University seller 0.0237**
(0.0013)
Month and year FE yes yes yes
Age dummy buyer yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes
Age dummy seller yes
Observations 137,239 78,187 78,187 77,856 77,547
R-squared 0.011 0.929 0.931 0.942 0.942
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS-regressions where the dependent variable is the log housing
price. Independent variables are the Mahalanobis distance and diﬀerent control variables. Standard errors
in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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between ﬁrst and second buyer) is less than 12 months are split from observations with
ownership length 12 months or above.16 The speciﬁcation from column (4) in Table 3 is
then run separately for each of the samples, with the results presented in Table 4.17
Table 4: Short and longer ownership length
Log price (1) (2)
Distance -0.00016 -0.00157**
(0.00055) (0.00017)
Log appraisal value 0.909** 0.789**
(0.0052) (0.0019)
Buyer log Wage 0.00027 0.00066**
(0.00039) (0.00014)
Buyer log Wealth 0.0042** 0.0052**
(0.00075) (0.00024)
Size of househ. buyer -0.0016 0.0016*
(0.0020) (0.0006)
No. of children buyer 0.0068* -0.0040**
(0.0029) (0.0009)
High school buyer 0.0040 0.0102**
(0.0040) (0.0013)
University buyer 0.0134** 0.0261**
(0.0042) (0.0014)
Villa 0.0116* -0.0052**
(0.0045) (0.0015)
Flat -0.0128* -0.0023
(0.0051) (0.0016)
Log square meters 0.027** 0.122**
(0.0057) (0.0019)
Month and year FE yes yes
Age dummy buyer yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes
Observations 7,586 70,101
R-squared 0.963 0.941
Notes: OLS-regressions, the speciﬁcation used in Table 3, column (4),
run separately on observations with ownership length below and above
12 months respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Mahalanobis distance has no signiﬁcant implications for the price of houses being owned
for a short time. This ﬁts with my interpretation of Mahalanobis distance as match
quality, as buying from a seller who did not buy due to the quality of the match should
oﬀer no predictions on match quality.
Another way to look at the connection between ownership length and my match qual-
ity measure is by interacting the two. As shown in Table A.4, in the appendix, the
16I do not know the exact date of ownership for many of the ﬁrst buyers. The start of ownership is set
to January 1st of the transaction year.
17The average Mahalanobis distances for the samples are respectively 5.82 and 4.65.
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Figure 6: Survival rates of buyers
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of the buyers with Mahalanobis
distance respectively above and below median.
Mahalanobis distance has a larger impact on price with longer ownership length of the
seller.
5.2 Consequences of match quality
There are a few likely consequences of having a good housing match. Here, I see if my
distance measure are correlated with these outcomes in a way that match quality should
be.
The most obvious outcome of having a good match is that expected time of stay should
be higher.18 Unfortunately, I do not observe the buyers for very long following the
transaction. Therefore, it is challenging to study whether distance is correlated with the
length of stay. But roughly eight percent of the buyers subsequently sell their house during
my observation period. I split the sample in two groups, with low and high Mahalanobis
distance, and do survival analysis of the two groups. As shown in Figure 6, a slightly
higher share of the group with low Mahalanobis distance remains in their homes than the
high Mahalanobis distance group, though the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.
As shown in the descriptive statistics (Table 2) the group with lower distance are younger
18Indeed, in labor models, job tenure is often used as a measure of match quality, see e.g. Bowlus
(1995) and Centeno (2004). While the simple model presented earlier in this paper does not display this
correlation, the housing search model of e.g. Ngai and Sheedy (2016) does.
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and have higher education and income. To see whether the diﬀerences in the distribution
of housing and buyer characteristics between low and high distance buyers have an impact,
I run a Cox proportional hazards model. The results, in Table 5, display some indications
that buyers with low distance remain in their home for a longer period. When controlling
for observable characteristics of the house, and also when adding municipality ﬁxed eﬀects,
the eﬀect of distance is positive on the probability of selling at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
Table 5: Hazard of selling
(1) (2) (3)
Distance -0.0019 0.0087* 0.0076*
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Log price -0.612** -0.207** -0.294**
(0.0203) (0.0292) (0.0463)
Buyer Log Wage -0.0070* -0.0080**
(0.0031) (0.0031)
Buyer Log Wealth -0.0332** -0.0313**
(0.0048) (0.0049)
Size of househ. buyer -0.0387** -0.0423**
(0.0126) (0.0127)
No. of children buyer 0.0320 0.0353
(0.0205) (0.0206)
High school buyer -0.0021 -0.0051
(0.0273) (0.0274)
University buyer -0.0106 0.0190
(0.0289) (0.0293)
Villa -0.331** -0.311**
(0.0338) (0.0347)
Flat 0.0592 0.0566
(0.0338) (0.0347)
Log square meters -0.486** -0.463**
(0.0312) (0.0398)
Month and year FE yes yes
Age dummy buyer yes yes
Municipality FE yes
Observations 137,227 135,839 135,839
Notes: This table presents the results of a Cox proportional hazards
model where the failure event is when a house is sold. Standard
errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Another probable consequence of a good housing match is that the owners are more likely
to have children. People who want to have kids may put more weight on a better match, as
moving is more costly with kids. To see whether this is reﬂected in my measure of housing
quality, I measure the increase in the number of children under 18 in the household at
end of year two after the year of housing purchase. I use a logit regression with increase
in number of children as dependent variable, distance and other factors as regressors. I
exclude households where the age of the buyer is 45 or above, as they are outside of the
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main childbearing age.
Table 6: Probability of children
New Children (1) (2) (3)
Distance -0.0174** -0.0943** -0.0978**
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Log price 0.792** 0.890**
(0.0261) (0.0473)
Buyer Log Wage 0.0330** 0.0293**
(0.0043) (0.0043)
Buyer Log Wealth -0.0012 0.0043
(0.0059) (0.0061)
Size of househ. buyer 0.539** 0.546**
(0.0179) (0.0185)
No. of children buyer 0.749** 0.699**
(0.0228) (0.0236)
High school buyer -0.114** -0.144**
(0.0325) (0.0331)
University buyer -0.0111 0.0270
(0.0324) (0.0335)
Villa -0.0763*
(0.0305)
Flat -0.527**
(0.0376)
Log square meters 0.0146
(0.0466)
Age dummy buyer yes yes
Municipality FE yes
Observations 99,263 99,207 98,073
Notes: This table presents the results of a logit regression where the out-
come is an increase in the number of children under 18 two years after
housing purchase. Only housing buyers below 45 years old are used.
Standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 6 show that the probability of increasing the number of children in the household is
decreasing in the distance between buyer and previous buyer (or increasing in the quality
of the match).
The results presented in this section support the use of similarity between buyers as a
proxy for match quality.
6 Conclusion
Housing search and matching models such as Anenberg and Bayer (2013) and Ngai and
Tenreyro (2014) often explicitly or implicitly predict correlations between average match
quality and easier observable housing market characteristics. A measure of match quality
23
could be used to test these predictions. Knowing the match quality distribution of the
population at a given time may also be helpful in predicting future levels of housing
transactions.
In this paper, a housing search and matching model is used to show why similar buyers
are more likely to be well matched, and can be predicted to pay more for their houses.
In the model, successive owners of houses should share characteristics if the observable
characteristics of a buyer are correlated with the buyer's preferences for housing.
I measure the similarity of a housing buyer and the previous buyer of the same house
(who is now selling), and argue that this similarity can be used as a proxy for match
quality. The similarity is measured as the Mahalanobis distance between characteristics
of buyers and past buyers.
I utilize a rich set of data, 139,688 repeated housing sales, where I know the characteristics
of the buyers in both set of transactions. Regressing prices on the similarity measure,
I show that buyers who resemble previous buyers are paying more, also when a large
number of observable characteristics are controlled for. This is in accordance with the
model presented.
The distance measure is shown to be lower (similarity higher) in larger housing markets
than in smaller markets, and negatively correlated with housing prices and transaction
numbers. It can be seen as support for the thick-market eﬀect in Ngai and Tenreyro
(2014), where match quality and prices are higher when the stock of houses for sale is
larger.
Supplementary analysis support that the distance between seller and buyer can be used
as a proxy for match quality. Matches with low distance lead to slightly reduced hazard
rate of reselling the house, and an increased probability of having children, both of which
would be expected in a high quality match.
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Appendix A: More on solving the model
To get to equation (6):
Combining the deﬁnition of η∗jk in (5) and the owner value function (4) gives:
β(Bj + Vk) + u =
u+γjk+η
∗
jk
1−β(1−δ) +
δVk
1−β(1−δ) which can be rewritten to (6)
Alternative for equation (10):
The steady state of value function of a buyer, B, (10), can alternatively be written:
Bj =
1− θ
1− β
∑
(
k
vk
vt
h∗(η∗jk)
1− β(1− δ) )
Equation (10) equals equation (7) in Ngai and Tenreyro (2014).
To get to equation (17):
E[Pjk] = (1− θ) u(1−β) + θE[H(bj , vk, η)|η > η∗jk]
or (1− θ) u
(1−β) + θ(H(bj , vk, η
∗
jk) + E[Sjk|η > η∗jk])
We know that E(Sjk|η > η∗jk) = E[η−η
∗
jk|η>η∗jk]
1−β(1−δ)
H(bj , vk, η
∗
jk) = β(Bj + Vk) + u = u+ β(
(
1− θ
(1− β)(1− β(1− δ))
)
(
∑
[
k
vk
vt
h∗(η∗jk)])
+
u
1− β + (
θ
(1− β)(1− β(1− δ)) )(
∑
j
[
bj
bt
h∗(η∗jk)])
=
u
1− β + β(
(
1− θ
(1− β)(1− β(1− δ))
)
(
∑
[
k
vk
vt
h∗(η∗jk)]) + (
θ
(1− β)(1− β(1− δ)) )(
∑
j
[
bj
bt
h∗(η∗jk)])
So E[Pjk] =
u
(1−β) + θ[β(
(
1−θ
(1−β)(1−β(1−δ))
)
(
∑
[
k
vk
vt
h∗(η∗jk)]) + (
θ
(1−β)(1−β(1−δ)) )(
∑
j
[
bj
bt
h∗(η∗jk)]) +
E[η−η∗jk|η>η∗jk]
1−β(1−δ) ], which can be rewritten as (17).
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Appendix B: Extra ﬁgures and tables
Figure A.1: Mahalanobis distance and transactions
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Figure A.1 plots the average Mahalanobis distance and housing transaction number over
time.
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Table A.1: Results, row-houses
Log price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance -0.0214** -0.0028** -0.0028** -0.0020** -0.0013**
(0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Log appraisal value 0.979** 0.972** 0.829** 0.822**
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Buyer log Wage 0.0013** 0.0013**
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Buyer log Wealth 0.0039** 0.0038**
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Size of househ. buyer -0.0004* -0.0012
(0.0014) (0.0014)
No. of children buyer -0.0012 -0.0005
(0.0019) (0.0019)
High school buyer 0.0050 0.0057*
(0.0027) (0.0027)
University buyer 0.0209** 0.0207**
(0.0027) (0.0027)
Log square meters 0.0792** 0.0829**
(0.0045) (0.0046)
Size of househ. seller 0.0023
(0.0016)
No. of children seller -0.0015
(0.0020)
High school seller 0.0109**
(0.0026)
University seller 0.0203**
(0.0027)
Month and year FE yes yes yes
Age dummy buyer yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes
Age dummy seller yes
Observations 21,123 11,668 11,668 11,627 11,596
R-squared 0.019 0.941 0.943 0.959 0.960
Standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table A.2: Results, villas
Log price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance -0.0133** -0.0009** -0.0009** -0.0007** -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Log appraisal value 0.994** 0.992** 0.923** 0.918**
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Buyer log Wage 0.0007** 0.0007**
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Buyer log Wealth 0.0040** 0.0040**
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Size of househ. buyer 0.0016 0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0010)
No. of children buyer -0.0008 -0.0009
(0.0014) (0.0014)
High school buyer 0.0096** 0.0092**
(0.0018) (0.0018)
University buyer 0.0224** 0.0215**
(0.0020) (0.0020)
Log square meters 0.0124** 0.0141**
(0.0027) (0.0028)
Size of househ. seller 0.0011
(0.0010)
No. of children seller -0.0008
(0.0015)
High school seller 0.0115**
(0.0018)
University seller 0.0187**
(0.0020)
Month and year FE yes yes yes
Age dummy buyer yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes
Age dummy seller yes
Observations 52,776 27,748 27,748 27,602 27,491
R-squared 0.005 0.956 0.957 0.964 0.964
Standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
29
Table A.3: Results, ﬂats
Log price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance -0.0231** -0.0026** -0.0029** -0.0019** -0.0010**
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Log appraisal value 0.913** 0.901** 0.675** 0.669**
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Buyer log Wage 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Buyer log Wealth 0.0065** 0.0064**
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Size of househ. buyer 0.0011 0.0006
(0.0008) (0.0008)
No. of children buyer -0.0107** -0.0104**
(0.0014) (0.0014)
High school buyer 0.0115** 0.0121**
(0.0019) (0.0019)
University buyer 0.0273** 0.0272**
(0.0020) (0.0020)
Log square meters 0.219** 0.225**
(0.0026) (0.0027)
Size of househ. seller 0.0026*
(0.0011)
No. of children seller -0.0076**
(0.0016)
High school seller 0.0154**
(0.0020)
University seller 0.0299**
(0.0020)
Month and year FE yes yes yes
Age dummy buyer yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes
Age dummy seller yes
Observations 63,350 38,771 38,771 38,627 38,460
R-squared 0.023 0.894 0.899 0.922 0.923
Standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table A.1-A.3 show the speciﬁcations from Table 3 run separately on the sample of
row-houses, villas and ﬂats. The size and signiﬁcance of the distance measures roughly
holds for all three speciﬁcations.
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Table A.4: Ownership length and distance
Log price (1) (2)
Distance -0.00139** -0.00047
(0.00017) (0.00032)
Ownership length 0.00019**
0.00003
Distance x ownership length -0.00002**
(0.00001)
Log appraisal value 0.801** 0.801**
(0.0018) (0.0018)
Buyer log Wage 0.00066** 0.00066**
(0.00013) (0.00013)
Buyer log Wealth 0.00506** 0.00507**
(0.00023) (0.00023)
Size of househ. buyer 0.0013* 0.0013*
(0.0006) (0.0006)
No. of children buyer -0.0027** -0.0027**
(0.0009) (0.0009)
High school buyer 0.0098** 0.0098**
(0.0013) (0.0013)
University buyer 0.0255** 0.0254**
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Villa -0.0057** -0.0054**
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Flat -0.0034* -0.0033*
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Log square meters 0.113** 0.113**
(0.0018) (0.0018)
Month and year FE yes yes
Age dummy buyer yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes
Observations 77,687 77,687
R-squared 0.942 0.942
Standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table A.4 shows, in the ﬁrst column, the results from column (4) in Table 3. In the second
column, I have included ownership length in months as a regressor, and an interaction
term between ownership length and Mahalanobis distance. The negative, signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on the interaction term indicates that the Mahalanobis distance has a larger
impact on price with longer ownership length of the seller. The coeﬃcients not aﬀected
by the interaction term are not noticeably changed by its inclusion.
31
Statistics Norway
Postal address:
PO Box 8131 Dept
NO-0033 Oslo
Oﬃ  ce address:
Akersveien 26, Oslo
Oterveien 23, Kongsvinger
E-mail: ssb@ssb.no
Internet: www.ssb.no
Telephone: + 47 62 88 50 00
ISSN: 1892-753X
D
esig
n
: Siri B
o
q
u
ist
